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tonically. At the intermediate level of nancial development, as the degree
of credit market imperfections diminishes and as asymmetric information
between borrowers and lenders is less pronounced, an economy exhibits
endogenous growth cycles. However, as the nancial sector matures, the
volatility in the growth process dissipates and the growth rates evolve
once again monotonically.
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1 Introduction
A long tradition in economics has stressed the importance of nance for eco-
nomic development (e.g. Schumpeter (1934)). Authors in this tradition (e.g.
Hicks (1969)) give historical evidence such as the industrial revolution in Eng-
land. They argue that the technology used for the rst stage of the industrial
revolution in England had been invented far earlier and that it was the devel-
opment of the capital market in England that made sustained growth possible.
Meanwhile, writers such as Keynes (1936) maintain that business uctuations
originate in the nancial system of an economy. This hypothesis is also sup-
ported by historical evidence such as the Great Depression before World War
II and the lost decade in Japan after the boom in the 1980s.
More recently a large number of economists have emphasized the importance
of nancial deepening in understanding macroeconomic phenomena such as eco-
nomic growth and business cycles. The empirical literature has produced evi-
dence for the positive eect of nancial development on economic growth. (See
for instance King and Levine (1993a,b), Levine (1997), Levine, et al. (2000),
and Aghion, et al. (2005).) Also, the positive relationship between nancial
development and economic growth has been demonstrated theoretically in an
extensive literature. (See for instance Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Galor
and Zeira (1993), Greenwood and Smith (1997), and Aghion, et al. (2005).)
Meanwhile, the relationship between the volatility of growth rates and nancial
development has been empirically investigated by several researchers (Easterly,
et al (2000), Denizer, et al. (2002), Raddatz (2006), and Beck, et al. (2006)).
Almost all of these empirical articles show that economies with well developed
nancial sectors experience low volatility of growth rates.1 However, the rela-
tionship between nancial deepening and the volatility of growth rates is still
an open question theoretically.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between nancial development
and the dynamic properties of growth rates with a dynamic general equilibrium
model.
Since small exogenous technological shocks cannot lead to persistent uc-
tuations of growth rates with a perfect credit market (Aghion and Banerjee
(2005)), credit market imperfections are a possible mechanism to derive such
persistent uctuations. Indeed, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) construct a dynamic
general equilibrium model in which persistent uctuations arise due to credit
constraints associated with the price of collateral. However, they do not study
1Beck, et al. (2006) do not discover a robust relationship between nancial development
and growth volatility. In particular, they give empirical evidence that in economies with less
developed capital markets, nancial intermediaries magnify the impact of ination volatility
on the volatility of growth rates.
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under what degree of credit market imperfections, or equivalently, under what
degree of nancial deepening, persistent uctuations are most likely to occur.
A few researchers have investigated this–but only a few. For example,
Aghion, et al. (1999), Aghion, et al. (2004), and Pintus (2007) investigate
the relationship between nancial deepening and endogenous business cycles;
however, they do not study the uctuations of growth rates but instead study
the uctuations of output with technological progress exogenously given. By
contrast, in this paper, we study endogenous growth and endogenous business
uctuations, both of which are aected by the degree of nancial deepening.
Our question is, “How does nancial deepening aect the dynamic properties of
growth rates?” In order to answer this question, we develop a dynamic general
equilibrium model following the Schumpeterian approach of Aghion and Howitt
(1992).
By the degree of nancial deepening (nancial development), we mean the
degree of credit market imperfections. Credit market imperfections result from
asymmetric information between savers and investors or between a nancial
intermediary and investors. Savers and investors are dierent entities in an
economy (Keynes (1936), Harrod (1939), and Aghion, et al. (1999)). However,
how and where do they interact with each other? If savers could nd investors
endowed with high-quality projects and lend funds to them, this must be good
not only for savers and investors in the current period but also for the entire
economy through all periods. However, asymmetric information between savers
and investors makes this impossible .
If a banking system is established in an economy, savers and investors make
nancial trades anonymously via the banking system. Savers do not have to
collect information about investors because they just make a deposit in a nan-
cial intermediary. On the other hand, investors can borrow from the nancial
intermediary at a given interest rate, which is determined endogenously in a
nancial market. Nevertheless, the agency problem remains because investors
are motivated to default after they borrow.
In our model, all nancial trades are executed via an innitely lived nancial
intermediary, which we call the “Bank” following Grandmont (1983).2 The Bank
imposes credit constraints on investors so as to avoid default. Credit constraints
are incentive compatible with borrowers not defaulting and are derived from the
optimal monitoring behavior of the Bank. The idea for the formulation is based
on Aghion, et al. (1999). In order to collect the obligated repayments, the Bank
monitors a borrower only when he defaults. The Bank incurs monitoring costs
2We assume that there is no equity market for direct nance. In our model, only small
rms borrow in order to nance their investments. One can imagine that it is hard for small
rms to issue equities because of agency problems.
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due to the moral hazard problem. The more monitoring cost the Bank pays,
the higher is the probability that it can collect repayments from a defaulting
borrower. In turn, when a borrower defaults, he has to pay default costs. Under
this situation, however, if a borrower faces credit constraints, he never defaults
because the returns when not defaulting are greater than the returns when
defaulting.
As a nancial sector becomes well developed, the monitoring costs decrease
and the default costs go up. Financial deepening must be due to well-functioning
institutions that protect property rights. As the monitoring costs go down
and/or the default costs increase, credit constraints will relax and the credit
market in an economy gets closer to a perfect one.
Our main ndings are as follows. In early stages of the development of a
nancial sector, growth rates evolve monotonically. At the intermediate level
of nancial development, as the degree of credit market imperfections dimin-
ishes and as asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders is less pro-
nounced, an economy exhibits endogenous growth cycles. However, as the -
nancial sector matures, the volatility in the growth process dissipates and the
growth rates evolve once again monotonically.
Aghion, et al. (1999) and Aghion, et al. (2004) obtain similar results to
ours with respect to uctuations of output, not growth rates. However, the
mechanisms that derive their results are completely dierent. In their models,
there is no choice for each agent to be a saver or to be an investor, whereas in
our economy, the choice for each agent to be a saver or an investor is crucial
to the emergence of endogenous growth cycles. In our model, agents are het-
erogeneous in creating capital goods, which become input goods for a research
and development (R&D) sector. More capable agents wish to establish their
own rms, borrow from the Bank, start investment projects and create capital
goods as long as the interest rate is less than their marginal products. On the
other hand, less capable agents prefer to make a deposit in the Bank rather
than to borrow, not creating capital goods, when their marginal products are
less than the interest rate. The cut-o level of the agents’ productivity which
divides agents into savers and investors is determined endogenously.
We obtain a dynamical system for this cut-o point, which originates in the
dynamic equation for net total assets in the private sector. The growth rate of
the economy is a one-to-one function of the cut-o point. Given the degree of
nancial deepening, if the cut-o point in the current period is small (large),
then the number of investors is large (small), and thus the growth rate is high
(low). Therefore, the dynamics of the cut-o point induces endogenous growth
cycles.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature related to
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this paper. Section 3 provides our model, and in section 4 we study equilib-
rium, deriving a function for the growth rate with respect to the cut-o point
of agents’ productivity. In section 5, we investigate the dynamic properties of
the economy. Section 6 discusses why endogenous uctuations arise in equilib-
rium. In section 7, we give numerical examples and observe that it is when the
degree of nancial deepening is at the intermediate level that the growth rates
endogenously uctuate. Section 8 compares our results to empirical evidence.
Section 9 gives concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
Our paper belongs to the literature on macroeconomics for credit market im-
perfections. (See for instance, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Greenwood and Jo-
vanovic (1990), Galor and Zeira (1993), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Green-
wood and Smith (1997), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).) In particular, as
we referred to in introduction, our paper is closely related to Aghion, et al.
(1999) and Aghion, et al. (2004). Aghion, et al. (1999) study a closed econ-
omy like ours, whereas Aghion, et al. (2004) investigate a small open econ-
omy.3 They also study the relationship between nancial development and the
dynamic properties of an economy; however, our model diers from theirs in
several respects.
First, as was already mentioned, in our economy, whether each agent be-
comes a saver or an investor is very important to the emergence of endogenous
growth cycles, whereas in their models, each agent cannot make a choice to be
a saver or to be an investor. In their models, the number of savers and investors
is exogenously given. The second point is that in Aghion, et al. (1999) the total
savings in a period are predetermined by the stock of wealth in an economy.
The total investments are determined by entrepreneurs’ wealth multiplied by a
constant credit multiplier. Therefore, the total investments are predetermined
as well. As a result, when the savings are smaller (greater) than the investments,
the interest rate increases (decreases). By contrast, in our model, we observe
opposite causation. In our model, an agent makes a decision on whether he
becomes a lender or a borrower, taking into account a prospective interest rate,
a prospective price of capital goods, and/or his own ability. For this reason, the
total investments are determined by future variables. Accordingly, if a prospec-
tive interest rate is high (low), a large (small) number of people tend to deposit
in the Bank, whereas a small (large) number of people tend to invest.
There are other articles which deal with the relationship between the de-
3See also Caballe´, et al. (2006). They show the existence of a complex equilibrium with
the model of Aghion, et al. (2004).
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gree of credit market imperfections and the dynamic properties of an economy.
Matsuyama (2004, 2006) investigates the accumulation of capital stock when an
economy faces credit market imperfections. Although Matsuyama’s models are
overlapping generations models like ours, our model diers from Matsuyama’s
models. The main dierence is that agents in his models can borrow only from
the other agents within a same generation as long as the economy is closed,
i.e., there is no intergenerational nancial trades in Matsuyama’s models.4 As
a result, the net credit position of a generation is zero. By contrast, in our
economy, individuals borrow or lend via the Bank. Accordingly, the net total
asset a generation holds can be positive or negative.
Our model also belongs to a long tradition of overlapping generations mod-
eling. That is to say, our model has hybrid aspects of Samuelson (1958) and
Diamond (1965). The hybrid aspects originate in the heterogeneity of agents’
productivity, due to which our model is tractable in studying credit market im-
perfections. In our model, less capable agents make a deposit in the Bank, not
starting investment projects. They are comparable to the agents in Samuel-
son’s consumption loan model. On the other hand, more capable agents start
investment projects. Those can be regarded as the agents in Diamond’s pro-
duction economy. A large number of articles have studied the dynamic prop-
erties for overlapping generations economies (see for instance Benhabib and
Day (1982), Grandmont (1985), Reichlin (1986), Farmer (1986), Benhabib and
Laroque (1988), Galor and Ryder (1989), Galor (1992), and Goenka, et al.
(1998)). However, none of these articles make clear under what degree of nan-
cial deepening endogenous growth cycles are most likely to arise nor do they
deal with credit market imperfections.
3 Model
The economy consists of overlapping generations: young and old agents. Time
goes from 0 to . Each agent lives for two periods. Following Bernanke and
Gertler (1989), we may think of a “period” as the length of a typical nancial
contract. Therefore, we may consider each individual as a small rm. The rate
of population growth is assumed to be n > 1. If the population of young
agents at time t is Lt, then Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt holds. Young agents can borrow
up to a certain limit from an innitely lived nancial intermediary which we
have called the Bank following Grandmont (1983). Namely, the Bank imposes
credit constraints on young agents.
4Matsuyama (2004) considers a small open economy as well.
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3.1 Governmental Agency: The Bank
The government establishes the Bank, by which each agent makes nancial
trades in the anonymous nancial market. The role of the Bank is two-fold.
One is to provide loans and the other is to monitor defaulting borrowers. While
the Bank is engaged in the loan business, the government’s credit position is
divided into two cases. If the government is indebted to the private sector, we
call this the government “debt” case. If the government has ownership of the
economy’s capital, we call this the government “credit” case.
3.1.1 Government Debt and Credit
Some of the young agents deposit a part of their income in the Bank. Those
deposits become nancial resources for the Bank to loan. Meanwhile, each
young agent can borrow against his future income by selling bonds to the Bank.
Young agents can consume, or invest in a project, more than their income in
the rst period by going into debt to the Bank.5
If the total stock of deposits made by young agents is greater than the total
stock of loans lent to them, this is the case of government debt. In each period,
the old agents redeem their government bonds. The government nances this
redemption by borrowing from young agents at the market interest rate. On
the other hand, if the total stock of deposits made by young agents is less than
the total stock of loans lent to them, this is the case of government credit. In
this case, the government owns a stock of loans to the private sector. In each
period, the old agents pay back their loans and the government reinvests the
proceeds by lending them to young agents at the market interest rate.
A loan made by the Bank is an exchange of real output in this period for
real output in the next period. The government debt at time t, Bt, is equal to
total deposits minus total loans in the economy at time t. So Bt > 0 in the
government debt case and Bt < 0 in the government credit case.
6 We assume
that in either case, the government does not conduct any scal policy, i.e., the
government does not levy any tax on agents or purchase any goods, except at
time zero. Under these circumstances, it follows that:
Bt+1 = rt+1Bt, (1)
5Similar assumptions are frequently made in the literature. See for instance Azariadis and
Smith (1993) and Rochon and Polemarchakis (2006).
6At rst sight, the assumption of negative Bt does not seem reasonable because we observe
that many governments in the real world run decits. However, we should note that Bt is the
net worth in the balance sheet of a government including tangible assets. The positive net
worth of a government is sometimes reported even if the government runs decits. For exam-
ple, Eisner and Pieper (1984) give evidence for the positive net worth of the U.S. government
from 1970 to 1980 (from 1946 to 1980 if the state and local governments are included).
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where rt+1 is the (real) interest rate at time t+1. Whether there is government
debt or credit is determined at time zero, when the government makes a lump-
sum transfer of B0 to the old (the debt case) or collects taxes equal to B0
from the old (the credit case).7
Note that Eq.(1) is equivalent to a goods-market clearing condition, because
of Walras’ law. To see this, we aggregate all variables at time t as follows:
Ct +Kt +Bt = Yt + rtBt1,
where Ct is aggregate consumption, Kt is aggregate investment, and Yt is aggre-
gate output. From the goods-market clearing condition, we have Ct +Kt = Yt.
Therefore Bt = rtBt1 holds.
3.1.2 The Bank’s Monitoring
In this subsection, we study why the Bank imposes credit constraints on agents.
The Bank’s monitoring gives a microfoundation for credit constraints. In what
follows, we will derive the inequality for credit constraints by modifying the
model of Aghion, et al. (1999). Suppose that each agent prepares his own
resources w˜t to invest. If he borrows bt > 0, his total resources are kt = w˜tbt.
Let the return on one unit of investments be Rt+1.
The Bank monitors borrowers only when the borrowers default in order
to collect debts as much as possible. When the Bank monitors a defaulting
borrower, it pays costs rt+1btC(p) to collect prt+1bt, where p  (0, 1) is
the probability with which the Bank can collect the obligated repayment and
C : [0, 1)  <+ is twice continuously dierentiable. We assume C(.)p > 0,
2C(.)
p2 > 0, C(0) = 0, limp1 C(p) = , and C0(0) < 1. As the Bank takes on
more costs, the probability to succeed in monitoring the borrower increases.
In turn, in order to default, borrowers have to pay default costs rt+1kt,
where we assume 0   < 1  C 01(1) < 1.8 The default costs are some
proportion of the returns which borrowers would obtain if they deposited kt in
the Bank. The default costs are considered as nes or social sanctions.
Under this loan contract, the incentive compatibility constraint so as for a
borrower not to default is given by:
Rt+1[w˜t  bt] + rt+1bt  [Rt+1  rt+1][w˜t  bt] + prt+1bt, (2)
7One should note that even if Bt > 0(< 0), there are borrowers (savers) in the generation.
Bt is a “total” of assets held by the generation.
8We impose this assumption so that every borrower faces credit constraints which are
severer than the natural debt limit. In fact, the closer is  to 1  C01(1), the more nearly
the credit market approaches a perfect one.
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which is rewritten as:
bt   
1 pkt. (3)
The left-hand side of Eq.(2) is the prots when the borrower invests in a project,
whereas the right-hand side of Eq.(2) is the gain when the borrower defaults. We
note that Eq.(3) is independent of the return on one unit of investments Rt+1.
In the next subsection, we shall assume that the values of Rt+1 vary between
agents. That is to say, the return on one unit of investments depends upon
the agents’ heterogeneous productivity. While the Bank has to know how much
the agent invests (kt), the Bank does not have to know the agent’s productivity
directly. As long as the Bank imposes a credit constraint given by Eq.(3) on each
agent, the incentive compatibility constraint Eq.(2) holds for any unobserved
the agents’ productivity which is reected in Rt+1.
In order to choose an optimal probability, the Bank solves its maximization
problem as follows:
max
p
 prt+1bt + rt+1btC(p).
Since rt+1bt > 0, this maximization problem is rewritten as:
max
p
p C(p).
From the rst-order condition, we have:
p = C 01(1). (4)
From Eq.(3) and Eq.(4), we obtain:
bt   
1 C 01(1)kt, (5)
where 
1C01(1) reects nancial deepening. We can say that the nancial
sector is well developed in an economy if the monitoring costs decrease, i.e., if
the function C(p) shifts down so that C 01(1) increases. In addition, nancial
deepening must be related to the social sanctions when an agent defaults. That
is to say, the nancial sector in an economy is well developed if  increases.
Since  < 1 C01(1), we can let  := 
1C01(1)  [0, 1) and thus:
bt  kt,
which is a credit constraint.  is the measure of nancial deepening.
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3.2 Individuals
3.2.1 Saving Methods
Each agent is born with one unit of endowments which we call labor. In the rst
period of his lifetime, he supplies labor inelastically and earns a wage income.
An agent born at time t consumes c1t when young and c2t+1 when old. There
are two saving methods for each agent. One is depositing his income in the
Bank. If an agent deposits one unit of his income in the Bank at time t, he will
gain a claim to rt+1 units of consumption goods at time t+ 1.
Alternatively, an agent can start an investment project, which will produce
capital goods. The capital goods created by agents are thought of broadly as
human capital or physical capital. The capital goods are used as input goods
for an R&D sector.
3.2.2 A Consumer’s Problem
In the rst period, each agent consumes, starts an investment project, deposits
his income in the Bank, and/or borrows from the Bank. In the second period,
he consumes all his earnings from the investments and from the deposits, and
he repays the Bank if he borrowed in the rst period.
Each agent maximizes his lifetime utility:
u(c1t, c2t+1) (6)
which is a function of consumption (c1t, c2t+1) in youth and old age, subject to:
c1t + kt + bt  wt (7)
zt+1 = kt (8)
c2t+1  qt+1zt+1 + rt+1bt, (9)
bt  kt, 0   < 1 (10)
kt  0. (11)
Eq.(7) is a budget constraint for the rst period. kt is the investment in a
project and bt is a deposit if positive and is a debt if negative. wt is the wage
at time t. Eq.(8) is a production function for capital goods. zt+1 is the capital
goods produced by the agent, and  > 0 is the productivity of the production.
Eq.(9) is a budget constraint for the second period. qt+1 is the (real) price of the
capital goods in terms of the consumption goods at time t+1. Again, rt+1 is the
(real) interest rate at time t+ 1. Eq.(10) is a credit constraint which the agent
faces. While the agent can deposit his income in the Bank as much as he wants
to, he can borrow from the Bank only up to some proportion of the investments.
As studied in the previous subsection, Eq.(10) is incentive compatible with the
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agent’s not defaulting. Again,  measures the degree of nancial deepening: if
 is large, the nancial sector is well developed, whereas if  is small, it is less
developed. Eq.(11) is a non-negativity constraint for the investment project.
The lifetime utility function u : <2+  < is continuously dierentiable and
strictly quasi-concave on the interior of the consumption set <2+. The utility
function is increasing in consumption in both periods: ui(., .) > 0 (i = 1, 2)
for (c1t, c2t+1) À 0, where ui(., .) is the derivative with respect to the ith
variable. Starvation is avoided in both periods, i.e., limc1t0 u2(., .) = 
and limc2t+10 u2(., .) = . Specically, we assume u(c1t, c2t+1) = c1tc12t+1
throughout the current model, where 0 <  < 1. By specifying the utility as
a Cobb-Douglas function, we can highlight the eects of nancial deepening on
the dynamic properties of the economy. If the income eect of the return to
savings is too strong relative to the substitution eect, equilibrium cycles will
appear without credit market imperfections.9 If we use a Cobb-Douglas util-
ity function, however, the income and the substitution eects are canceled by
each other. Accordingly, equilibrium cycles will not arise without credit market
imperfections.
3.2.3 Heterogeneous Agents
Now the heterogeneity of agents is introduced in terms of their productivity in
producing capital goods. When an agent is born, he receives a shock for his
productivity level  from a time-invariant distribution G() whose support is
[0, a], where a > 0. We impose some assumptions on the distribution function
G().
Assumption 1
• R a
0
dG() <.
• G() has a continuous density g() on [0, a].
The productivity of each agent is private information. Each agent knows his
own productivity at his birth, while other agents do not know his productivity.10
In the Diamond overlapping generations model, agents are homogeneous, i.e.,
 = 1 for every agent. By contrast, in our model, the agents’ saving technol-
ogy depends upon their heterogeneous productivity. As we solve a consumer’s
9See for instance Grandmont (1985).
10Hence, less capable agents cannot ask more capable agents to produce capital goods. For
this situation, one could imagine that less capable agents face prohibitively high costs to
identify more capable agents.
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problem in what follows, we shall nd that the heterogeneity of agents is crucial
when savers and investors are endogenously determined.
Let us solve the utility maximization problem for a consumer. Let st :=
kt + bt. Since kt  0 and bt  kt, it follows that st  (1 )kt  0. Hence,
we can rewrite an agent’s maximization problem as follows:
max
st0,0kt st1
u(wt  st, rt+1st + (qt+1 rt+1)kt). (12)
In this maximization problem, st > 0 holds because limc2t+10 u2(., .) = .
Since u2(., .) > 0, if rt+1 > qt+1, then it is optimal for the agent to choose kt =
0 and st = bt. Since we have assumed u(c1t, c2t+1) = c

1tc
1
2t+1, the rst-order
condition with respect to st is given by:  u(c1t,c2t+1)c1t +(1)rt+1
u(c1t,c2t+1)
c2t+1
=
0 	 c2t+1 = (1)rt+1 c1t. From this equation, Eq.(7), and Eq.(9) we obtain
bt = (1  )wt. On the other hand, if rt+1 < qt+1, then the agent chooses
kt =
st
1 . The rst-order condition is then given by:  u(c1t,c2t+1)c1t + (1 
) qt+1rt+11
u(c1t,c2t+1)
c2t+1
= 0 	 c2t+1 = 1 qt+1rt+11 c1t. Now from this
equation, Eq.(7) and Eq.(9), we obtain kt =
(1)wt
1 and bt = (1)wt1 .
 is used for the index of the heterogeneity of agents. Therefore, we hence-
forth put it on each variable as c1t(), etc. Lemma 1 summarizes the above
results.
Lemma 1
Let t :=
rt+1
qt+1
. Then, the following claims hold.
• If t > , then kt() = 0 and bt() = (1 )wt.
• If t < , then kt() = (1)wt1 and bt() = (1)wt1 .
Proof : The claims have been proven in the above discussion. ¤
As seen in lemma 1, t is a cut-o point, i.e., if an agent’s productivity is
greater than t, he starts an investment project, borrowing from the Bank. In
this case, the returns to his savings are subject to his productivity. He obtains
more returns from the investment in a project than from a deposit in the Bank.
On the other hand, if an agent’s productivity is less than t, he only deposits a
part of his income in the Bank. He prefers to deposit in the Bank rather than
to invest in a project. We can ignore agents with  = t because they have
no impact on the economy. As the parameter for nancial deepening  gets
greater, both investments and borrowings of the agents with  > t become
large.
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3.3 Final Production Sector
The general goods are produced in a nal production sector, which becomes
consumption goods and investment goods. The general goods are produced
from a continuum of intermediate goods, which is distributed uniformly in [0, 1].
A CES production function is assumed for the production of the general goods,
and is given by:
Yt =
"Z
i[0,1]
(Aitxit)
di
# 1

, (13)
where Ait is the quality of the ith intermediate good and xit is its quantity. We
dene ² := 1
1 as the elasticity of substitution between input goods, which is
greater than one since   (0, 1).
The nal production sector is competitive and the representative rm solves
the maximization problem given by:
max
xit
Yt 
Z
i[0,1]
p˜itxitdi, (14)
where p˜it is the price of the intermediate good i. From the rst-order condition,
we have an inverse demand function for the intermediate good i:
p˜it = A

itx
1
it Y
1
t . (15)
3.4 Intermediate Sector
The intermediate sector consists of a continuum of rms, which is distributed
uniformly in [0, 1]. This distribution is time-invariant because for the interme-
diate sector, new innovators come out into the market at each period. Due to
the newly invented technologies, new innovators make monopolistic prots. The
newly invented technologies may be protected by patents or it may take time
for the technologies to be imitated. The monopolistic prots, however, will dis-
appear in one period since the next newly invented technologies are introduced
into the market by other innovators after one period goes by.11
The intermediate goods are produced from labor with a one-for-one technol-
ogy, i.e., an intermediate rm needs one unit of labor to produce one unit of
xit. The maximization problem for an intermediate rm is given by:
max
xit
p˜itxit  wtxit
= max
xit
Aitx

itY
1
t  wtxit, (16)
11The prots gained by the newly invented technologies are greater than those by the old
technologies. Therefore, the newly invented technologies are always adopted rather than the
old ones.
13
where wt is the wage rate. From the rst-order condition, we obtain:
wt = A

itx
1
it Y
1
t , (17)
and
it = (1 )AitxitY 1t . (18)
From Eq.(15) and Eq.(17), we note that p˜it =
wt
 . The prices of all the inter-
mediate goods are the same in each period.
An intermediate rm supplies the intermediate good with up-to-date quality,
which is developed in an R&D department within the rm.12 The quality of the
intermediate goods is improved by the R&D activities. Ha and Howitt (2007)
empirically examine a production function for the quality improvement of in-
termediate goods. Using the data for the USA, the UK, France, Germany, and
Japan, they study which model is most suitable to reality: the rst generation
endogenous models, the semi-endogenous models, or the fully-endogenous mod-
els with product proliferation.13 They conclude that a functional form which is
used in the fully-endogenous models with product proliferation such as Howitt’s
(1999) model is most plausible. Following them, we assume a functional form
for the quality improvement as follows:
Ait+1 Ait
Ait
= 
³ zit+1
AitLt
´
, (19)
where we assume that 0 < 	  1.14 This assumption guarantees that the
demand function of input goods slopes downward.  is a productivity parameter
of the R&D department, zit+1 is the capital goods for the R&D activities, and
Lt is the population of young agents at time t. Following Jones’ (1995) critique,
the right-hand side is adjusted for scale eects in three respects. First, as
Ait becomes big, it is dicult for the quality of the intermediate goods to be
improved. We divide zit+1 by Ait in order to remove this kind of scale eect
and obtain the quality-adjusted input goods. Second, we divide zit+1/Ait by
Lt in order to deal with a scale eect which comes from the increasing number
of individuals. Finally, the production exhibits non-increasing returns to scale
with respect to the input goods, i.e., 0 < 	  1.
12As discussed in Aghion and Howitt (1992), we may assume that separate rms are engaged
in the R&D activities. In this case, the rms in an R&D sector sell their newly invented
technologies to the rms in an intermediate sector. No results will change with this alternative
assumption.
13For details, see Ha and Howitt (2007).
14Although the current economy is closed and thus all markets clear within the economy,
we may allow technology transfers from abroad, by replacing Eq.(19) with an equation which
expresses the rate of technology adoption as in Aghion, et al. (2005) and Howitt and Mayer-
Foulkes (2005).
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Since each R&D department is in the patent race, the demands for capital
goods are determined by the research-arbitrage condition:
it+1 = qt+1zit+1,
where again qt+1 is the (real) price of capital goods. Using Eq.(18), we rewrite
this equation as:
(1 )Ait+1xit+1Y 1t+1 = qt+1zit+1. (20)
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Growth Rate
The heterogeneity of the intermediate rms is assumed away: all the intermedi-
ate rms are symmetrical. From the labor market clearing condition, we haveR
i[0,1] xitdi = Lt. Since due to the symmetry, the same amount of labor is used
in each intermediate rm, xt = Lt holds. Each R&D division uses the same
amount of input goods as well. Let this amount be z˜t. Then, z˜t :=
R
i[0,1] zitdi
holds. Hereafter, all variables are independent of i. From the assumption of
symmetry and Eqs.(13), (17), and (20), we have the following equations:
Yt = AtLt
wtLt = AtLt = Yt
qtz˜t = (1 )AtLt = (1 )Yt.
We note that Yt = wtLt + qtz˜t holds, namely the nal output is distributed to
the wages and the returns to the investments.
From lemma 1 and wt = At, the market clearing condition (of the R&D
sector) is given by:
z˜t+1 =
Z a
t
(1 )wt
1  LtdG()
	 z˜t+1 = (1 )AtLt
1  F (t), (21)
where F (t) =
R a
t
dG(). Given t, the right-hand side of Eq.(21) is a supply
of input goods for the R&D sector.
Substituting Eq.(21) into Eq.(19), we can derive a growth rate (which is
dened by the growth rate of per capita output) as follows:15
(t) :=
³At+1
At
´
1
= 
³ (1 )
1  F (t)
´
. (22)
15Again, due to symmetry, Eq.(19) is independent of i.
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We note that the rst-order eect of  on the growth rate is positive, i.e., for a
given t, as  increases the growth rate goes up. We also note that the growth
rate is a decreasing function with respect to t. As t increases, the number of
investors decreases. Accordingly, for a given , the total investments go down
and thus the growth rate decreases.
The above discussion about the eect of  captures only the rst-order eect
on the growth rate. However, a change in  will aect the value of t indirectly,
which is thought of as a general equilibrium eect. In particular, as we will see,
 has a positive eect on t in the steady states. Therefore, at this point, if
an economy is in a steady state, we are uncertain whether  has a positive or
negative eect on the growth rate because the growth rate is decreasing with
t. In the analysis of the steady state below, we will discuss the eect of  on
the growth rate, taking into account the indirect eect.
4.2 Dynamics
Bt is net total assets held by young agents at time t, i.e., Bt is the government
debt at time t, which is equal to total deposits minus the total loans. From
lemma 1 and wt = At, we obtain:
Bt =
Z t
0
(1 )AtLtdG()

Z a
t
(1 )AtLt
1  dG()
=
(1 )Yt
1  [G(t) ]. (23)
We note that the total loans
R a
t
(1)AtLt
1 dG() are aected by the degree of
nancial deepening . Since qt+1z˜t+1 = (1  )Yt+1, substituting Eq.(21) into
this yields qt+1 =
(1)(1)Yt+1
(1)F (t)Yt . Therefore, rt+1 = qt+1t =
(1)(1)tYt+1
(1)F (t)Yt .
Substituting the last and Eq.(23) into Eq.(1), we have:
(1 )Yt+1
1  [G(t+1) ]| {z }
Bt+1
=
(1 )(1 )t
(1 )F (t)
Yt+1
Yt| {z }
rt+1
(1 )Yt
1  [G(t) ]| {z }
Bt
,
(24)
which reduces to a dierence equation of the cut-o point, t:
G(t+1) =
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
t(G(t) )
F (t)
+ . (25)
Let us dene a function as follows:
() :=
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
(G() )
F ()
+ .
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We note that the dierence equation Eq.(25) is independent of  , 	, the popu-
lation growth n, and the quality of input goods, At. The growth rate (t) is a
one-to-one, continuous function of t  [0, a].16 Therefore, the dynamic proper-
ties of the growth rates are deduced directly from those of the cut-o point. In
what follows, we shift our focus to the study of the dynamic properties of the
cut-o point for awhile.
4.3 Steady-State Analysis
4.3.1 Two Steady-State Equilibria
A steady-state equilibrium t = ¯ solves the following equation:
G(¯) =
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
¯(G(¯) )
F (¯)
+ . (26)
We note that there exist two steady-state equilibria, ¯ =  and ¯ = ,
(unless they are repeated values,) such that:
G() =  (27)
and

F ()
=
(1 )
(1 )(1 ) , (28)
respectively.
In the steady-state equilibrium with ¯ = , a generation’s net credit posi-
tion is always zero, whereas in the steady-state equilibrium with ¯ = , the
net credit position is positive or negative. We call equilibria with ¯ =  and
with ¯ =  a non-trade steady-state equilibrium and a trade steady-state equi-
librium, respectively. Whether a steady-state equilibrium is called a non-trade
or a trade steady-state equilibrium, agents within a generation make nancial
trades via the Bank. In the non-trade steady state, the credit market clears
within a generation, whereas in the trade steady state, agents make nancial
trades intergenerationally and the credit market clears over two generations. In
this sense, by “non-trade” we mean that agents in a generation do not trade
with the agents in the other generation.
4.3.2 Comparative Statics with respect to 
Now we investigate the eect of the change of  on a growth rate, taking into
account a general equilibrium eect.
16The “one-to-one” is due to assumption 1.
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Proposition 1
As a nancial sector is well developed, i.e., as  increases, the following hold:
• The growth rate goes up in the non-trade steady state, i.e., () > 0.
• The growth rate goes up in the trade steady state as well, i.e., () > 0.
Proof : See appendix.
King and Levine (1993a,b) and Levine, et al. (2000) give empirical evidence
for the positive eect of nancial development on economic growth. Our results
for the steady states are consistent with their discoveries. From Eqs.(27) and
(28), we note that both  and  increase as  goes up. This means that
the number of investors decreases, which negatively aects the growth rate.
However, from lemma 1, although there are fewer investors, we note that each
investor borrows and invests more now than before  went up. This latter
positive eect is stronger than the former negative eect in both steady states.
Therefore, the growth rate always goes up in the steady states.
The model captures well the properties of nancial deepening. As a nancial
sector is well developed, the mis-allocation of production factors is corrected.
Namely, as  goes up, less capable investors turn into savers and the economic
resources concentrate on more capable investors. As a result, eciency in the
economy is promoted. Less capable agents can utilize the ability of more capable
agents. This is an essential characteristic of nancial deepening.
5 Dynamic Properties
In this section, we investigate the dynamic properties of the economy. As seen
in Eq.(22), (t) is a one-to-one, continuous function of t  [0, a]. This means
that if the equilibrium sequence, {t}t=0, exhibits cyclical behavior, then so
does the equilibrium sequence of the growth rates, {(t)}t=0.
We dene a compact interval in < as X = [0,max{, }]. We restrict the
domain of the dynamical system of Eq.(25) to X so as to obtain economically
meaningful equilibria. If {t}t=0 starts with 0  (max{, }, a], then G(t)
becomes greater than one in nite time. Such a sequence does not become an
equilibrium. We assume that the minimum of () (which is just the right-
hand side of Eq.(25)) is no less than zero unless we explicitly state otherwise.17
17If the minimum of () is less than zero, then for almost all the initial values 0  X, the
sequence {t}t=0 escaping from X is not an equilibrium because the credit market clearing
condition does not hold. The remaining subset of X is a Cantor set, whose Lebesgue measure
is equal to zero. In fact, even if the minimum of () is less than zero, the equilibria exist.
On the remaining Cantor set, we easily observe two steady-state equilibria. There also exists
a period-two equilibrium cycle. To the best of my knowledge, in the literature of economics,
only Boldrin, et al. (2001) deal with equilibria on Cantor sets.
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Having restricted the domain of the system to X, then the map,  : X  X,
is continuous and maps X into itself. Henceforth, we use the pair (X,) to
denote our dynamical system.
We linearize the dierence equation Eq.(25) around a steady state:
t+1  ¯ = (¯)(t  ¯),
where () = (1)(1)(1)F ()
h³
1
g() +

F ()
´
(G() ) + 1
i
.
The local stability depends upon whether  is greater than  or not.
Proposition 2
• If  > , then the non-trade steady-state equilibrium (¯ = ) is
locally stable, whereas the trade steady-state equilibrium (¯ = ) is
locally unstable.
• If  < , then the non-trade steady-state equilibrium (¯ = ) is
locally unstable, whereas the stability of the trade steady-state equilibrium
(¯ = ) is ambiguous.
Proof : If  < , then |()| = | (1)(1)(1)F () | < | (1)(1)

(1)F () | = 1 and
|()| =
¯¯¯³
1
g() +

F ()
´
(G()  ) + 1
¯¯¯
> 1. If  > , then
|()| = | (1)(1)(1)F () | > | (1)(1)

(1)F () | = 1. However, we cannot know
whether |()| =
¯¯¯³
1
g() +

F ()
´
(G()  ) + 1
¯¯¯
is greater than one
or not. ¤
The phase diagrams for each case are given in Figures 1-3. As seen in Figure
3, if the trade equilibrium is locally unstable, it is possible for the dynamical
system to exhibit cycles. At minimum, in this case we must have a period-two
cycle.
[Figures 1-4 around here]
Proposition 3
Suppose that  < . If the trade steady-state equilibrium is locally unstable,
there exists a period-two cycle of {t}t=0 in equilibrium.
Proof : Let ˜() = G1(()). Then Eq.(25) is written as t+1 = ˜(t). We
can take 0 close to 
 so that ˜2(0) < 0 <  because () > 1. If the
trade steady-state equilibrium is locally unstable, then () < 1. So we can
take 00 close to 
 so that ˜(00) < 
 < 00 < ˜
2(00) < ˜
2(0). Therefore,
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by continuity, there exists ¯0 such that ˜(¯0) < 
 < ¯0 = ˜2(¯0) < ,
which means that there exists a period-two cycle. ¤
A graphical analysis gives a proof of proposition 2 as well. Since  < , if
the trade steady-state equilibrium is locally unstable, () < 1 holds. The
conguration of t+1 = G
1((t)) in this case is drawn in Figure 4. Its mirror
image relative to the 45 degree line is drawn as well. As seen in the gure, there
exists at least one pair of ¯0 and ¯1, where ¯1 6= ¯0, such that ¯1 = G1((¯0))
and ¯0 = G
1((¯1)).
Since the initial value 0 is determined by the individuals’ expectations, it
can jump. Therefore, the equilibrium is indeterminate globally, i.e., for any
initial value 0  X, the sequence, {t}t=0 is an equilibrium of this economy.
There is an extensive literature on this topic in overlapping generations models.
Therefore, we do not investigate indeterminacy here. Our interest is in how
nancial deepening aects the deterministic dynamic properties of the growth
rates.
6 Financial Deepening and Cycles
In the previous section, we have examined the dynamical system analytically
and we have seen the appearance of cycles in equilibrium. In this section, we
investigate under what conditions are endogenous growth cycles more or less
likely to arise.
Let us consider the case in which  = 0. If  = 0, then  = 0 holds
from Eq.(27). Therefore, from the rst part of proposition 2 and from its phase
diagram, {t}t=0 monotonically converges to ¯ =  = 0 whenever {t}t=0
starts with 0  [0, ). Therefore, cycles do not arise. By continuity, given
other parameters and the distribution function for , there exists 0 such that
for   [0, 0] almost all of the sequences {t}t=0 which start with an arbitrary
value of 0  X monotonically converge to ¯ =  = 0. Meanwhile, if  is
suciently close to one, the rst term of Eq.(25) degenerates and thus wherever
{t}t=0 starts in X, it converges to an asymptotically stable steady state.18 In
this case, no cycles appear either. Again by continuity, we can claim that given
other parameters and the distribution function for , there exists 1 such that
for   [1, 1) almost all of the sequences {t}t=0 with 0  X converge to an
asymptotically stable steady state. From these discussions, we note that if a
nancial sector is well developed or less developed, endogenous growth cycles
do not appear. It is when nancial development is at an intermediate level
that endogenous growth cycles might arise. We summarize these discussions in
18However, in this case, we cannot specify to which steady state, ¯ =  or ¯ = , the
economy converges.
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proposition 4
Proposition 4
Suppose that 1 > 0. Then, the following hold.
• If  is in [0, 0] or [1, 1), the economy converges to an asymptotically
stable steady state.
• If  is in (0, 1), the economy might exhibit endogenous, deterministic
growth cycles.
From proposition 2, we note that it is in the government credit case that the
economy oscillates. Essentially, the dynamic properties of {t}t=0 depend upon
the market clearing condition, i.e., Bt+1 = rt+1Bt because Eq.(25) originates in
this equation. In it, both rt+1 and Bt are functions of t. Since rt+1 = tqt+1 =
(1)(1)(1+n)t
(1)F (t) ((t) + 1) =
(1)(1)(1+n)t
(1)
h
	
F (t)1
¡ (1)
1
¢
+ 1F (t)
i
,
rt+1 is increasing with t. From Eq.(23), Bt is increasing with t as well.
Nevertheless, an increase in t at the beginning of period t has an ambiguous
eect on t+1. This is because Bt could be negative. As we have seen in
the previous section, if the trade steady-state equilibrium ¯ =  is locally
unstable, then the economy exhibits endogenous growth cycles in equilibrium.
In what follows, we will see that it is possible that the economy oscillates when
 is the intermediate value.
[Figure 5 around here]
Suppose that the economy is in the trade steady-state equilibrium at the
beginning of time t. In this case, since (1)(1)(1)

F () = 1, we obtain the
steady-state interest rate as follows:
r = (1 + n)(() + 1). (29)
We note that if the growth rate is zero, i.e., () = 0, then the steady-state
interest rate r is equal to the “biological” interest rate. On the other hand,
from Eq.(23) the government debt in the steady state is given by:
B =
h
(1 )G() (1 )
1  (1G(
))
i
Yt, (30)
where Yt is given when we look atB
 at time t. Since we assume the government
credit case now, B < 0 holds.
Now suppose that the economy faces a shock so that the prospective interest
rate at time t+1, rt+1, goes up. In this case, agents whose productivity is slightly
greater than  turn from investors into savers. Therefore, relative to the trade
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steady state, the number of savers increases, whereas the number of investors
decreases. As a result, Bt goes up; however, it is still negative and thus the
absolute value of Bt decreases. If  is not close to one, i.e.,  is an intermediate
value, then from Eq.(30) the increase in Bt is small relative to the increase in
rt+1. In this case, rt+1Bt decreases, which means that the nancial resources of
the Bank at time t+1 go up. Accordingly, the prospective interest rate at time
t + 2, rt+2, goes down. As a result, t+1 becomes smaller than 
 and thus
the economy oscillates. If the sequence {t}t=0 does not converge, equilibrium
cycles emerge.
From the proof of the second part of proposition 2, it follows that if
³
1
g()+

F ()
´
(G()  ) < 2, then the trade steady-state equilibrium is locally
unstable. In this case, we note from the phase diagram that endogenous growth
cycles arise without fail, whether the minimum of () is no less or less than
zero.19 From the assumption of the second part of proposition 2, we have
G() < 0. Therefore, the condition for cycles must hold if 1g()+ 

F ()
is very big. For instance, whenever the density at  is very thin, i.e., g()
is very small, this value becomes large. Therefore, depending upon the distri-
bution of , if nancial development is at an intermediate level, it is always
possible that endogenous growth cycles arise.
Figure 5 is a plot of the set of values (, , ) which give cycles in equilibrium
when we assume a uniform distribution in [0, 1] for  (where again the minimum
of () is no less or less than zero). We also note that as  goes up, the set of
, which results in cycles, becomes small. Therefore, in order to obtain cycles in
equilibrium, the high complementarity between intermediate goods is needed.
As  increases, the rst-period income also increases. Accordingly, each agent
does not have to borrow so much. As a result, the value of Bt increases and
becomes positive and  becomes greater than  (see proposition 2.2). We
also note that as  becomes greater, the set of  gets bigger. This is because
as  becomes greater, each agent puts more weight on rst-period consumption
and thus the aggregate amount of borrowings becomes greater. As a result, Bt
becomes negative and its absolute value gets large. Then, a small change in the
value of rt+1 (reecting the change in t) eects a large change in the value of
Bt+1.
7 Numerical Analysis
A growth rate has a one-to-one relationship with a cut-o point. Therefore, we
have investigated the dynamic properties of the cut-o point. We have made
19By studying the phase diagram for the case in which the minimum of () is less than
zero, we can note that there exists at minimum a period-two cycle in such a case.
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clear under what value of  endogenous growth cycles appear. However, we did
not make clear to what kinds of cycles the economy converges in equilibrium.
In this section, in order to investigate the dynamic properties of the sequences
{t}t=0 and {(t)}t=0 numerically, we create bifurcation diagrams. These
diagrams are helpful for us to understand the asymptotic dynamic properties
of the economy concretely. We again assume that  
 U(0, 1). We would
like to study the relationship between the degree of nancial deepening and
the dynamic properties of the growth rates. Therefore, we create bifurcation
diagrams with respect to .
The dynamics of growth rates is given by the system of two equations:
t+1 = (t) =
2(1 )(1 )
(1 )
t(t  )
1 2t
+ 
and
(t) = 
³ (1 )
1  F (t)
´
. (31)
We create the bifurcation diagrams for the dynamical system iterating 10000
times. In this numerical analysis, it is hard to pin down the value of . The
parameter  captures three dierent things. The rst is the labor share of out-
put excluding human capital. As mentioned before zt+1 is broadly thought of
as physical and human capital and wt is paid to young agents who are probably
unskilled. If we use the lower limit of the unskilled labor share estimated by
Mankiw, et al. (1992),  = 0.29. Second, 1/ is the mark-up ratios of inter-
mediate goods. The mark-up ratios of United States industries are estimated
empirically (for example Hall (1988), Norrbin (1993) and Basu (1996)). Third,
1/ captures complementarity between intermediate goods. The smaller is ,
the greater is the complementarity. However, the complementarity between in-
termediate goods is dicult to measure. In this numerical analysis, we assume
high complementarity between intermediate goods and we let  = 0.25. We ex-
amine the various cases for :  = 0.55,  = 0.56, and  = 0.57. If we suppose
that the annual discount rate is 0.92, then  = 0.54 and  = 0.57 approximately
correspond to the discount rates for 2 years and 3.5 years, respectively. This
interval must be the intermediate terms of debt contracts between nancial in-
termediaries and small rms. We choose the initial condition to be 0 = 0.01.
20
20We can verify that  : X  X is a (upside-down) unimodal map: the critical point is
m := 
1+

12 . In this case, it is well known that for a given , if a Schwarzian derivative,
S() :=
000()
0()  32 (
00()
0() )
2 < 0 for all   X  {m}, then the asymptotic behavior of
almost all sequences {t}t=0 will be the same. Therefore, the choice of initial conditions does
not matter. See for example Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983). Our Schwarzian derivative
is too complicated to investigate its sign analytically. However, we plotted the values of our
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[Figures 6-8 around here]
Figures 6-8 give bifurcation diagrams for t with respect to the degree of
nancial deepening, i.e., . As predicted in the previous section, for all cases, if
 is small or large, {t}t=0 converges to an asymptotically stable steady state
and thus the growth rates converge to a stationary growth rate as well. For
each case, however, if the value of  is in the intermediate region, endogenous
uctuations appear. When  = 0.55, as  goes up from zero or goes down from
one, the economy experiences period doubling bifurcations. At the intermediate
values of , a globally stable period-eight cycle arises. When  = 0.56 and
 = 0.57, the economy exhibits a complex dynamics in the intermediate region.
For example, when  = 0.57, as  increases from zero, we observe the rst
period doubling bifurcation around  = 0.298 and the second period doubling
bifurcation around  = 0.393. These bifurcations are repeated over and over
again and eventually the economy enters a complex region (shaded regions in
the diagrams). As seen in gure 2-7, when  = 0.56 similar things happen.
[Figures 9-11 around here]
A new nding from these bifurcation diagrams is that the amplitudes of
cycles increase as  goes up. We note from lemma 1 that as  increases, agents
put more weight on the rst-period consumption and thus the total borrowings
in the economy go up. While the total borrowings go up, the investments by each
investor go down (lemma 1), which leads the price of capital goods to climb up.
As a result, the cut-o point goes down and the number of investors increases.
This means that more agents are subject to the credit constraints when  is
large than when it is small. Hence, we may say that the enlarged amplitudes of
cycles are due to the credit market imperfections agents are facing.
Figures 9-11 are the corresponding bifurcation diagrams for (t). As pre-
dicted in proposition 2.1, as  increases, the growth rates go up for all cases.
For each case, we observe endogenous growth cycles in the intermediate values
for . The amplitudes of the growth rates are around 2-3%. Of course, we
cannot compare the amplitudes in these numerical examples with those in a
real economy because these analyses are not rigorous calibrations, although the
amplitudes seem small. The amplitudes depend upon the distribution of , as
well as upon the other parameters. In particular, the function F (t) aects the
amplitudes. If the average of  is large, the amplitudes become big because
Schwarzian derivatives and numerically conrmed that the signs are negative. In addition, to
make sure, we examined various initial values: we found that the asymptotic behavior of the
dynamical system is invariant to the initial condition.
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F (0) becomes big in this case. Furthermore, we should note that these ampli-
tudes are for the stationary states without any exogenous shocks. If we take
into account exogenous shocks or noise, the amplitudes must be greater. Even
in that case, endogenous growth cycles play an important role, complementing
the role of exogenous shocks for business cycles.
8 Relation to Empirical Evidence
We have investigated the relationship between nancial deepening and the dy-
namic properties of growth rates. We have discovered that (i) if a nancial sector
is very developed or poorly developed, an economy never exhibits endogenous
growth cycles, and that (ii) if nancial deepening is at an intermediate level,
endogenous growth cycles may appear.
Easterly, at al. (2000) and Denizer, et al. (2002) give empirical evidence that
exogenous macroeconomic shocks, such as productivity shocks and monetary
shocks, are more repressed in an economy with a very developed nancial sector
than in an economy with a poorly developed nancial sector. That is to say, a
well developed nancial sector plays a role in stabilizing and reducing growth
volatility. Although they emphasize the reduction of growth volatility generated
by exogenous shocks and they do not consider the structural non-linearity of an
economy, their results are not inconsistent with the results of our model.
In our model, if the economy faces exogenous shocks, then persistent growth
cycles occur if the development of a nancial sector is at an intermediate level.
Since their results are probably obtained with the data for countries with a
middle-to-high degree of nancial development (because it is hard to obtain
data for countries with a lowest degree of nancial development), their results
are consistent with our predictions.
9 Concluding Remarks
Financial deepening has eects on macroeconomic phenomena such as economic
growth and business cycles. Our main ndings are as follows: (i) if the develop-
ment of a nancial sector is at an intermediate level, endogenous, deterministic
growth cycles will arise and (ii) if a nancial sector is very developed or poorly
developed, the economy converges to an asymptotically stable steady state.
Namely, it is when the development of a nancial sector is at an intermediate
level that growth rates are highly volatile.
We make a nal remark for future research. If we rewrite our model with
nominal variables, it can be applied to a study of the relationship between
nancial deepening and excess volatility in ination rates. To the best of our
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knowledge, no article has studied such a relationship theoretically or empirically.
However, it is very important to understand excess volatility in ination rates
in terms of nancial deepening. In our model, 1rt+1 1 is equal to a net ination
rate if we use nominal variables. From rt+1 =
(1)(1)(1+n)t
(1)F (t) ((t) + 1), we
guess that if the development of a nancial sector is at the intermediate level,
due to the tF (t) , the ination rates are far more volatile than the growth rates,
which seems consistent with episodes in the real world. This investigation is left
for future research.
Appendices
i) Proof of proposition 1
We take four steps to show proposition 1.
Step 1 : If ¯  [0, a), then F (¯) > ¯(1  G(¯)), since F (¯) = R a
¯
dG() >R a
¯
¯dG() = ¯(1G(¯)).
Step 2 : 


= 1
g() , which follows from G(
) = .
Step 3 : F ()  (1  )g() = (1  )F (
)


 . This is because
from 

F () =
(1)
(1)(1) , we have:
log   logF () = log
h(1 )
(1 )
i
 log(1 ).
Therefore, we have:h 1

+
g()
F ()
i



=
1
1  (32)
	 F () (1 )g()




= (1 )F (
)





.
Step 4 : Case 1: ¯ = . From step 1, it holds that:

F ()
<
1
1G() =
1
1 . (33)
From step 2 and Eq.(33), we have:
(1 ) + F ()
(1 )2 > 0
	
g()(1 ) 1g() + F ()
(1 )2 > 0
26
	 
g()(1 ) + F ()
(1 )2 > 0
	 



hF ()
1 
i
> 0
	 
(
)


> 0.
Case 2: ¯ = . From Eq.(32), 

 > 0 holds. Then, from step 3, we have:
(1 )F () 


(1 )2 > 0
	
g()(1 ) + F ()
(1 )2 > 0
	 



hF ()
1 
i
> 0
	 
(
)


> 0. ¤
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Figure 1:  > 
0 a
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Figure 2:  < , No Cycles
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Figure 3:  < , Cycles
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Figure 4: Period-Two Cycle
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Figure 5: {, , } for cycles
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Figure 6: Bifurcation Diagram for phi, Gamma=0.55
Figure 7: Bifurcation Diagram for phi, Gamma=0.56
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Figure 8: Bifurcation Diagram for phi, Gamma=0.57
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Figure 9: Bifurcation Diagram for growth rate, Gamma=0.55
Figure 10: Bifurcation Diagram for growth rate, Gamma=0.56
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Figure 11: Bifurcation Diagram for growth rate, Gamma=0.57
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